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Abstract 
 
What drives asset transactions on the Norwegian Continental Shelf? This study 
evaluates the influence of commodity prices, as well as energy reserves, on the 
number of asset transactions per year on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS). The 
empirical data collected from the NCS from 2000 to 2014 seems to suggest that 
merger and acquisition transactions are influenced by oil reserves; the data also shows 
that gas reserves are an upside for the acquirer involved in merger and acquisition 
transactions. Surprisingly, changes in oil prices and acquisitions show causality in 
both directions. However, although causality is found, the correlation between the 
change in oil price and mergers and acquisitions transactions is weak and with low 
significance; the reasons for this behavior will be discussed in detail. Furthermore, by 
use of a triangulation method, a description and classification of the possible strategic 
drivers related to the asset transactions on the Norwegian Continental Shelf during the 
last 14 years is also presented. This study is based mainly on the publicly available 
data from the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate.  
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Abbreviations 
 
SDFI State Direct Financial Interest 
NCS Norwegian Continental Shelf 
USD US Dollars 
NOK Norwegian Krone 
Mill Million 
Sm3 Standard cubic meters 
oe Oil equivalent 
Bbl Barrel 
ft3 Cubic feet 
M&A Mergers and Acquisitions 
NPD Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 
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1. Introduction 
 
Many arguments about the reasons for mergers and acquisitions can be found in the 
literature, although these types of transactions in the oil and gas industry have not 
received as much focus as they require. Ng and Donker (2013) studied the effects of 
different factors behind the management decisions for mergers and acquisitions in 
Canada by using data from the oil and gas industry. However, they did not focus on 
the traditional economic and environmental factors, but evaluated the reasons for 
mergers and acquisitions from a novel perspective; that of energy reserves and 
commodity prices. 
 
Asset transactions in Norway can be an interesting topic. Norway, with an average oil 
production of 1.9 million barrels of oil per day, has a global position in the oil and gas 
industry; it was ranked 15th by national oil production in 2014, and third by oil 
exports for 2013.1 And it seems that Norway has still an active portfolio for future 
developments; at the end of 2013, thirteen fields were under development, forecasting 
a total future investment for 2014 and 2015 of approximately 120 billion krone.2  
 
Mohn and Misund (2011) mentioned that oil and gas investments have focused on 
increasing the ownership of scarce oil and gas reserves during recent years, and 
Ferguson and Popkin (1982) proposed that the only reason for a company in the oil 
and gas industry to purchase reserves is to increase the amount of resources owned by 
that company; however, they did not empirically demonstrate this. They also 
mentioned that the market price of the target must be equal to the market price of its 
resources. They gave the explanation that behind the premium value of an asset is the 
depreciation tax shield, which gives added value to the company.  
 
This study will be divided into five main parts. The first section provides a general 
background for the first decades of the history of oil production and the initial years 
of the industry in Norway. The second part will give a detailed explanation of the 
main parameters considered for an asset evaluation and the model used for it; after 
                                                
1U.S. Energy Information Administration (http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/).  
2 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (http://npd.no/en/Publications/Resource-
Reports/2014/Chapter-3/).  
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this the reader will possess the basic general knowledge required to understand some 
of the concepts and theories discussed later on, after the findings. Third, the 
hypotheses for this study will be presented. The hypotheses developed are based on 
the results obtained by Ng and Donker (2013); they showed that energy reserves and 
prices influenced the corporate decision making for mergers and acquisitions in 
Canada, and similar hypotheses will be tested based on data available for the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf. In the fourth part, a discussion of how commodity 
prices and energy reserves influence decisions in mergers and acquisitions will be 
presented, and also a description and classification of the possible strategic drivers 
behind the transactions in the NCS during the last 14 years.  
 
The fifth and final part will consist of a set of conclusions and recommendations 
based on the results of this study.  
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2. Definition of Terms 
 
In this chapter, some of the concepts that are used during the data acquisition, 
analysis, results and discussion will be defined.  
2.1 Asset 
For this study, the definition of “asset” will be related to the participation interest of a 
company in a Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) production license. The production 
license can be linked to a production field or an exploration area; in this study, both 
active and inactive production licenses will be included. The reason for this decision 
is that although currently a production license may be classified as inactive in the 
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate database, during the period of interest that 
transaction may have been active and valid. 
2.2 Transaction 
The definition of “transaction” in this study will be closely related to a partial or total 
change in a company’s participation in an asset. The reasons behind the different 
possibilities determining the companies’ changes in participation will be discussed in 
detail when the strategic drivers are defined and listed.  
2.3 Divestitures and acquisitions 
Divestiture will be the general term used to describe a transaction from the seller’s 
point of view. Conversely, acquisition will be the general term use to describe a 
transaction from the acquirer’s or buyer’s perspective. 
2.4 Mergers 
Mergers will be the general term used in this study to refer to mergers and takeovers; 
they will describe the merging of assets from a company’s and not from an assets 
perspective.  
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3. Introduction to the oil and gas industry 
3.1 Oil and gas industry 
The first phase of the modern oil industry is generally associated with Colonel Edwin 
Drake, in the United States in 1859. A later event in the history of the oil industry 
occurred in 1882, when the Standard Oil Trust was created by John D. Rockefeller, 
from the union of Standard Oil and 39 affiliated companies. These companies 
controlled 90% of the kerosene market at that time (Inkpen and Moffett, 2011). 
 
The second important phase began in 1901, when the Spindletop oil field was 
discovered in East Texas. After this event, petroleum was used as a major fuel for 
future inventions, among them the airplane and automobile. The age of oil and gas as 
among the most important sources of energy had started (Inkpen and Moffett, 2011). 
 
In 1911, the monopoly of power created by Rockefeller was forced to dissolve, and 
this event gave birth to the oil companies known as the “Seven Sisters” (Inkpen and 
Moffett, 2011). There was also another important player, the Compangie Française de 
Petroles (CFP), which in some cases was known as the “Eighth Sister”. To gain a 
perspective of the power of these companies, in 1971 the Seven Sisters and CFP 
accounted for about 81 percent of the global crude oil production; in 2006 the same 
companies accounted about 12 percent (Davis, 2006). The transformation over time of 
the Seven Sisters can be observed in Table 3.1.  
Table 3.1 Transformation over time of the Seven Sisters and Total. (Table based on 
that presented by Davis, 2006, p. 3) 
 
1971 2000 2014 
Esso 
Royal Dutch Shell 
British Petroleum 
Chevron 
Texaco 
Gulf Oil 
Mobil 
Exxon/Mobil 
Royal Dutch Shell 
BP-Amoco-Arco 
Chevron Texaco 
 
ExxonMobil 
Royal Dutch Shell 
BP 
Chevron 
CFP TotalFinaElf Total 
 
Since 1971, many acquisitions of small companies by big ones and other mergers 
have occurred; some say these mergers were vital due to the heavy capital 
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investments required in new oil provinces, and also as a way to reduce risk exposure 
(Davis, 2006). 
3.2 General Strategy in the Oil Industry 
To understand better the main strategies in the oil industry, it is necessary to start 
discussing the value chain; value refers to what the customers are willing to pay, and 
the value chain includes each one of the specific actors that create value during the 
process (Inkpen and Moffett, 2011).  
 
There are three main segments in the oil and gas industry value chain; see Figure 3.1. 
A short description of each of them is given below (Inkpen and Moffett, 2011): 
 
a. Upstream: related to exploration and production 
b. Midstream: related to transportation and trading 
c. Downstream: related to refining and marketing 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Value chain the in oil and gas industry. Image taken from BP’s website. 
http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/images/large-images/our-business-model-
700x490.jp 
 
Although some of the oil companies discussed in this study have integrated operations 
in the three segments mentioned above, the focus of this study will be on the upstream 
component. 
 
The creation of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 
1960 had the objective of shifting the bargaining power between oil-producing 
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nations and oil companies (Inkpen and Moffett, 2011). Before the OPEC 
nationalization in the early 1970s, the oil companies had ownership of the oil and gas 
reserves, as well as the refining capacity and marketing, in what is known as vertical 
integration (Davis, 2006). When the verticality was broken by the OPEC 
nationalization, the major oil companies tried to keep their vertical integration by 
signing long-term supply contracts with the new owners of the crude oil reserves and 
focusing on developing new oil provinces outside OPEC, among them the North Sea 
(Davis, 2006). 
 
Although the oil companies could ensure crude oil supply by the use of contracts, the 
volatility of the oil price could not be controlled. The stronger influence in the oil 
price will be on hands of the OPEC countries. The common picture was the existence 
of different oil prices between producers, and also over time. This was changed by the 
emergence of markets where there were contracts for specific types of crudes; 
namely, the Brent and the West Texas Intermediate, the former in the North Sea and 
the latter in the United States of America. These contracts could be traded in 
organized future markets. The advantage was clear; the oil production from the 
upstream sector could be sold to any buyer, not just the downstream part of the same 
company. Meanwhile, the refineries could ensure future supply with a more stable 
range of future prices (Davis, 2006).  
 
3.3 The North Sea and the oil industry 
It is important, in case the reader is not familiar with the region, to start by 
mentioning that the Norwegian Continental Shelf is divided currently into three 
regions (see Appendix A). They are, from south to north: 1) The North Sea, 2) the 
Norwegian Sea, and 3) The Barents Sea.  
  
Although the stories of the British and Norwegian continental shelves were 
developing at the same time, the main focus here will be on the latter.   
 
In the northern coastal region of the Netherlands in 1959, there was the discovery of 
the Groningen gas field; this was the first event that gained the attention of the oil 
companies in the North Sea (Nelsen, 1991). 
 13 
 
In September 1962, representatives of the Phillips Petroleum Company evaluated the 
possibility of oil in the Norwegian Continental Shelf; later that year they approached 
the former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Trygve Lie, the only Norwegian 
they had in mind, and delivered a draft proposal for exploration purposes in the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf (Nelsen, 1991).  
 
In 1962 the oil industry did not yet exist in the North Sea. Norway, as well as the UK, 
was not ready to let foreign companies explore for oil and gas. The Norwegian 
Continental Shelf was not even divided, and legislation about how to regulate these 
activities was nonexistent (Noreng, 1980). Within three years, all of this had changed. 
 
The government was currently researching the best way to open areas for exploration, 
and several models were studied. The royal decree was promulgated on April 9, 1965; 
thus the Norwegian licensing system was born, and it was created to uphold the 
tradition that the nation would regulate foreign investment. There were two types of 
licenses created; reconnaissance licenses and production licenses (Nelsen, 1991). 
 
The first areas given for exploration were of about 500 square kilometers, larger than 
in the UK, with the purpose of attracting more attention from the oil companies. The 
first oil discovery was made in 1967 by Esso, but the field was considered not to be 
economical at that time; 32 years later it was brought into production as the Balder 
field3. Another discovery, this time in 1968 by Phillips Petroleum, was the Cod field; 
a gas condensate field, which was also considered too small to be profitable. It 
seemed there had been relatively little success in the first round, and due to this the 
government announced a second round of licensing. This time, participation was 
limited to the companies that had been assigned with production licenses in the first 
round (Nelsen, 1991). 
 
On December 23, 1969, after drilling 33 dry holes and close to giving up, thanks to 
government pressure Phillips Petroleum decided to drill the last well, 1000 feet away 
from the last one. Thus they struck an oil and gas giant, which they called Ekofisk; 
                                                
3  Source NPD (http://npd.no/en/Publications/Norwegian-Continental-Shelf/No1-
2015/) 
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and this is how the oil boom was born on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (Nelsen, 
1991). 
 
As stated earlier, the oil companies were looking to develop new oil provinces outside 
of OPEC, due to all the political intervention in the oil companies’ activities, Norway 
included. In 1971 the government decided to review their policies, emphasizing state 
participation in the oil activities (Noreng, 1980). It cannot be denied that Norway had 
been waiting for favorable conditions upon which they could revise their policies 
(Nelsen, 1991). 
 
The last step of the state’s intervention was the birth of its own national oil company, 
Statoil; a national oil company was seen as a tool that allowed the government to 
directly influence decisions about development and investment in diverse oil activities 
(Nelsen, 1991). 
 
In the decades to come, offshore activity would increase considerably, and policies, 
regulations, and tax reforms would evolve as well. Some of the most relevant changes 
in tax regulations made during the last 14 years will be mentioned here. The first was 
in April 2001, which created the possibility of deducting onshore losses against 
offshore tax. The rules regarding deductibility and financing costs were tightened, and 
the allocation of financing costs was based on written down declared asset tax value, 
but there were no changes to the uplift and depreciations rules. The second reform 
occurred during June 2003; the main change was that all abandonment costs became 
tax-deductible in the same year that expenses are paid. The third change happened 
during May 2004, in which the total amount of uplift applied to capital expenditure 
rose to 30% over four years (starting on January 1, 2005). The government decided to 
pay back exploration expenditure in the same tax year as expenses incurred, finally 
guaranteeing that the full value of any losses due to operating in the NCS could be 
realized. The last change was in May 2013; this involved new legislation on the 
treatment of uplift. The rate was reduced to from 30% to 22%. 
3.4 Classification of the oil companies 
Shuen et al. (2014) commented on the increase of the strategic complexity for 
managers, due to the increase in different competitors who are not homogeneous: for 
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example, National Oil Companies (NOCs), International Oil Companies (IOCs), and 
independents. It is possible to observe how many company types exist in the oil and 
gas industry. What will differentiate the oil companies is not just the assets that they 
own, but the way they operate and the procedures they follow (Garcia et al., 2014). 
For the purposes of this study, the companies that are in the upstream part of the value 
chain of the oil and gas industry will be the main focus. 
 
A proposed classification of the different oil companies in the industry, based on the 
clarification given by Davis (Davis, 2006), will be used. Seven types of oil companies 
are identified in the table below: 
Table 3.2 Classification of oil companies according to type of activity and size 
Type Characteristics Example 
Integrated oil 
company (IOC) 
• Upstream, midstream and 
downstream 
• Large and medium size 
! Chevron 
! ExxonMobil 
! Shell 
! Eni 
! Marathon 
International oil 
company (IOC) 
• Upstream, midstream and 
downstream 
• Compete internationally 
• Partnership with National oil 
companies 
! Chevron 
! ExxonMobil 
! Shell 
 
Supermajor • Upstream, midstream and 
downstream 
• The *5 largest oil companies 
! BP 
! Chevron 
! ExxonMobil 
! Shell 
! Total 
National oil 
company (NOC) 
• Upstream, midstream and 
downstream 
• Controlled by national 
government 
! Statoil 
! Gazprom 
! Petrobras 
! Pemex 
Independent • A nonintegrated company 
• Generate revenue from 
upstream or downstream 
activities 
! ConocoPhillips 
Junior • Small firms  
• Production between 500 and 
10,000 barrels of oil 
equivalent per day 
! Noreco 
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4. Market value of an asset in relation to mergers and acquisitions 
 
Ng and Donker (2013) presented a short illustration of how reserves and commodity 
prices can influence mergers. The model of synergy and wealth they presented to 
explain merger and acquisitions between two companies is expressed as follows:  
 !"#$%&'&!"#$% + !"#$%&!"#$% = !"#$%&'(! "#$%ℎ 
 
There will be synergy if the combined wealth is larger than the Acquirer + Target.  
 
The wealth in a natural resource firm is the difference between the sales of the 
resource, less the costs of the extraction, plus the remaining resources (Ng and 
Donker, 2013). In the equation below, the sales and cost overtime are discounted to 
the present value. 
 (!"#$% − !"#$# + !"#"$!"#)!"#$%&' + (!"#$% − !"#$# + !"#"$%"#)!"#$%&= !"#$% − !"#$# + (!"#"$%"#)!"#$%&'( 
 
To gain a better understanding of each of the components in the equation above, they 
will now be discussed in more detail.  
4.1 Sales 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Historical and forecasted total production for the NCS (source: NPD) 
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The element evaluated in the sales part of the equation for a project in the oil industry 
is the production profile; the production volumes times the oil price will give the 
revenue of the asset (Wood, 2013). This can be gross, for the total value for the whole 
asset, or net, if the working interest of the company in that asset is less than 100%; for 
example, if working in a joint venture. Joint ventures had already become common; 
Aramco and CalTex were familiar models. The objective was to share risk in 
exploration, because of the increased costs and risk in the volatility of oil prices 
(Olien, 2002). An interesting finding worth mentioning was made by Boyer and 
Filion (2007); they found that increasing oil and gas production caused a lower return 
in the market (their study was focused on the Canadian market). 
 
Although oil is the main product the companies are interested in, gas also forms an 
important part of the volumes and reserves evaluated. The units that will be used in 
this study are sm3 for oil volumes, sm3 for gas, and finally sm3 of oil equivalent (oil 
and gas).  
 
There are four phases that can define the life of an asset; the definitions given by 
Nelsen (1991) will be used. These are: 
 
! Exploration: This phase is related to understanding the geology of the area. 
Seismic data is an important part of the exploration and gives a better picture 
of the possible prospect. Some characteristics, such as source rock, reservoir 
rock, trap, and migration, must be evaluated for the prospect to be considered 
interesting enough to merit drilling a well to confirm the presence of 
hydrocarbons. 
 
! Development: This phase will start as soon as the evaluation of the prospect is 
implemented, regarding the volume and the confirmation that it is 
economically profitable to plan to develop the field. Sometimes more data is 
required if there are high uncertainties in volumes, so the drilling of appraisal 
wells may be necessary. 
 
In offshore developments, the acquisition of platforms equipped to drill wells 
may be necessary (the number of wells depends on the development strategy 
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and the size of the prospect), as well as facilities to process fluids (oil, gas, and 
water).  
 
The development of an offshore asset requires a similarly high capital 
investment to that of a manned space mission or an advanced weapon system 
(Nelsen, 1991). 
 
! Production: It can be said that this phase starts as soon as hydrocarbons begin 
to flow; in some cases this can be even before the development phase is 
finished. The production of the asset will start gradually increasing to the new 
wells as they come into stream; in some cases a plateau of a constant 
production period will be reached, followed by a decline in production.  Extra 
investment is required in this period to try to boost the production, such as by 
keeping the energy in the reservoir by injecting fluids, or, for example, by 
infill drilling. 
 
Non-operated assets amount to 22 – 59% of the Supermajors’ production. 23% 
of equity production worldwide is delivered by non-operated ventures. In most 
cases, non-operated ventures are not as well-managed as the operated ones, 
making the exposure to risk higher and preventing the realization of the full 
potential of the venture (Shuen et al., 2014) 
 
! Abandonment: when the production in the field has reached the economical 
limit, the rate of production is too low and the cost to produce the oil is very 
close to the price of selling it. In this case, ceasing production is agreed, and 
the removal of the structures must start.  
 
The oil price has been shown to be highly volatile (Figure 4.2), and that is the reason 
why companies can be quite conservative at the moment of forecast oil prices; 
however, the volatility of oil prices is also one of the factors that motivate investment 
(Mohn and Misund, 2009). The best practice among the oil companies is to generate 
different scenarios to evaluate the impact of the oil price on the value of an asset and 
on the economy of a project (Inkpen, 2011).  
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Figure 4.2. Crude oil prices 1861-2014 (U$/barrel, world events). Source: Annual 
average prices in US$ per barrel. Based on “BP Statistical Review of World energy”, 
June 2015.  
 
4.2 Costs 
 
Figure 4.3 Investment forecasts for fields under development by project type. (Source: 
NPD) 
 
The cost term definitions and way companies group them vary from firm to firm, but 
in general, costs, investments or expenses of the asset can be classified in six groups: 
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• Capex: Capital expenditure; this is the cost related to building infrastructure 
(platforms, pipelines, subsea facilities and other) necessary to produce the 
field. 
• Drillex: Drilling expenditure; this is the cost related to drilling. Some 
companies classify this cost together with capex.  
• Opex: Operational expenditure, usually related to the operational cost to keep 
the facilities running in acceptable condition. The cost for personal and 
administrative expenses can be placed within this classification. 
• P&A: Plug and Abandonment costs; the expenses related to plugging wells or 
removing facilities and equipment at the end of production. 
• Taxes: 
! Income Taxes: A percentage of the difference between the revenue 
and the expenses will be paid to the government. 
! Environmental taxes: In the oil industry, this is related to the carbon 
and nitrogen emissions that the production of hydrocarbons can 
generate; these are proportional to the quantity of the contaminants 
produced. 
• Tariffs: The use of oil or gas pipelines to transport the hydrocarbons has a 
cost related to it. This will be proportional to the volume of hydrocarbons. 
4.3 Reserves 
The volume of oil in a reservoir is denominated oil-in-place (OIP), in the same way 
that gas receives the name of gas-in-place (GIP). These are the total volumes of 
hydrocarbons present in the reservoir, and just a fraction will be produced. How much 
can be produced will depend on the complexity of the reservoir, the technology 
required and existent at the moment, the location of the asset, and the economic limit 
of the asset. The last factor usually means that the investment required to produce a 
barrel of oil after taxes must be lower than the price in the market for that barrel. 
 21 
 
Figure 4.4 Proven resources over time (source: NPD) 
 
 
Although many authors relate production to reserves, “reserve” can be a wide term, 
and it is important to understand the different type of reserves. Inkpen (2011) presents 
the classification of reserves according to the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) guidelines, as follows: 
 
• Proved Developed: it can be produced with the existent infrastructure; the 
additional investment required is low. 
• Proved Undeveloped: it requires additional investment; for example, extra 
investment in drilling. 
• Unproved possible: it has a 50 percent probability of being recovered, and 
there is enough evidence to prove this. 
 22 
• Unproved probable: There is a less than 10 percent probability of its being 
recovered, and there is not much evidence of hydrocarbon presence other than 
logs and geological interpretation. 
 
4.4 Financial metrics 
After defining the sales and cost profile, it is possible to obtain a net cash flow profile 
(the difference between them). In order to understand the value of an asset, several 
financial metrics can be used, but the most common are the net present value (NPV), 
and the internal rate of return (IRR) (Inkpen, 2011): 
 
• Net present value (NPV): The principle behind the NPV is that the value of 
money in the future is less than the value of money today. To obtain the NPV, 
each of the yearly net cash flow values is discounted to the current year; after 
that all the values are added and this will produce the net present value of that 
asset. !"# = !"!1+ ! !!!!!  
Where: 
 !"# = Net present value !"! = Future value at time t ! = Discount rate ! = Time step 
 
The discount rate used in the calculation of the NPV refers usually to the 
“risk-adjusted cost of capital”.  
 
In reality, most companies expect that an investment will create value above 
the weighted average cost of capital (WACC); this is known as the corporate 
hurdle rate, and additionally some companies impose a risk premium that is 
specific to the investment (Inkpen, 2011). 
 ! =!"## + !"#$%!"&!!"#$!%!!"#$!!"#$!!"!!"#$%"& + !"#$!!"#$%&$ 
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• Internal rate of return (IRR):  This is the value of the discount rate at which 
the net present value is equal to zero. Usually a project or asset that has an 
IRR higher than discount rate (i) is preferred. 
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5. Literature Review 
 
In general, an asset transaction can be viewed as a set of strategies that a company 
uses as a means to increase the value of the company itself. To better understand the 
concept, a basic definition of strategy will be presented, and finally a summary of 
previous literature on mergers and acquisitions will be presented.  
5.1 Basic concept of strategy 
The origin of the word strategy derives from strategos, an ancient Athenian position 
responsible for representing each of the ten tribal divisions instituted by Kleisthenes. 
Strategos was related to the group of stratos (army); after this term was born, the 
complexity of decision making in the military arena also increased (Cummings, as 
cited in De Wit, 2010). 
 
5.1.1 Strategy framework 
It is possible to assume that strategy is related very closely to the activities of a 
company, giving a sense of unity, purpose and direction. Six dimensions of strategy 
can be identified (Hax, 1994): 
 
a) Integrative pattern of decisions 
b) Defining the organization’s purpose 
c) Defining competitive domain 
d) Response to external opportunities and threats (competitive advantage) 
e) Logical system for differentiating managerial tasks at different levels 
f) Economic and non-economic contributions by the company to its 
stakeholders. 
 
A more complete definition of strategy is the framework a company uses to manage 
its resources and adapt to changes to gain competitive advantage, keeping as its 
ultimate objective the benefit of its stakeholders (Hax, 1994). An additional feature 
that can give value to the concept of strategy is that strategy can also be analyzed as a 
pattern: “A consistency in behavior whether or not intended” (Mintzgerg, 2003). 
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With these concepts in mind, it is possible to observe strategy in the oil industry, and 
how this has changed in response to threats or opportunities. 
5.1.2 Change in strategy, adaptation by the oil companies 
As discussed before, this study will concentrate on the upstream segment of the oil 
industry. To understand the main strategy of oil companies, in this study the focus 
will be on two terms that have been explained previously: reserves and production.  
 
The reserves can change due to changes in oil price; this means that in scenarios with 
low oil prices, the proven reserves of a field can be reduced mainly due to the 
reduction in the economic life of the field. The opposite could happen too: in high oil 
price scenarios, the economic field life can be extended, increasing the proven 
reserves in that field.  
 
The production of an oil company will sooner or later decline if new findings or 
improvements for accelerating production are not made. If a company could produce 
all its reserves, it would cease trading as an upstream player, so it is necessary to 
replace the production volumes by increasing the reserves. The increase in reserves 
can occur in two ways: 1) by successful exploration; and/or 2) by the acquisition of 
new assets. Acquisition rather than exploration is a defensive strategic reaction 
(Casertano, 2013). 
 
5.2 Mergers and acquisitions strategy 
Many authors have studied mergers and acquisition activities from different 
perspectives. One of the earliest authors is Reid (1973), who studied economic 
diversification and integration in multinational investments, by evaluating corporate 
mergers in the American petroleum industry; he also evaluated the response of the 
stock value of companies in relation to divestiture. Later, Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
developed the theory of the ownership structure of the firm, and demonstrated how 
managers can increase their welfare by reducing shareholder value. Ferguson and 
Popkin (1982) theorized about the reasons for mergers and acquisitions. In addition to 
increasing the proven reserves of the acquirer, the increase in depreciation by using 
tax deduction means that the acquirer gets direct benefit from the government; they 
analyzed a merger case to support this theory. Regan (1984) highlighted the 
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responsibility of management in takeover activities. He also commented on the 
“mergermania” during the early 1980s; he described the period of 1983-1984 as an 
unusual set of circumstances combining to be ideal for merger activity. Cooper and 
Richards (1988) presented the Sohio experience as a case study of oil takeover. They 
mentioned as well that corporate managers may not only be looking to maximize the 
value of the firm, but selfless interest could also be one of the basic concerns during 
takeovers. Mitchel and Mulherin (1996) showed that volatile oil prices contributed to 
the takeover wave of the 1980s, and studying merger and acquisition waves at 
industry level could help to achieve a better understanding of merger and acquisition 
behavior. Weston (1999) described mergers and acquisitions in the petroleum industry 
as a reflection of the accelerating rate of merger and acquisition activity worldwide. 
He proposed that the triggers for mergers and acquisitions are the instability of prices, 
and other increased risks in the oil industry. Olien (2002) mentioned that every major 
swing in the price of oil, gas, and refined products drove mergers and acquisitions, as 
well as the restructuring and reconfiguration of major firms, implementation of new 
cost-saving technologies, and cuts in workforces. Harford (2005) found evidence 
supporting the neoclassical model as an explanation of merger waves. Mergers can be 
understood as a response to shock by the industry, creating clusters of merger activity, 
and he also proposed that the merger activity observed has a dependency on the 
existence of capital liquidity. Rhodes–Kropf et al. (2005) empirically tested the two 
proposed theories about the overvaluing of targets during merger and acquisition 
activities. The first of these, proposed by Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan in 2004, is 
a rational theory based on misinformation causing errors in the potential value of 
synergies. The second theory, proposed by Shleifer and Vishny in 2003, is based on 
an irrational stock market and self-interested target managers interested in producing 
cash quickly. Boyer and Filion (2007) showed that the price of the oil and gas 
commodities is what drives the value of the oil and gas firms, but no individual firm 
has an impact on the commodity price. Verde (2008) studied European mergers and 
acquisitions from January 2000 to November 2006, and found that some companies 
were now interested in managing gas activities together with electricity activities. He 
identified two different dynamics: 1) a trend towards the creation of pan-European 
players, and 2) a trend towards the establishment of ‘‘national champions’’; he 
confirmed these dynamics by a simple statistical analysis of M&As among companies 
in the natural gas or electricity industries. Granier and Podesta (2010) proposed a 
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model for competition and another for mergers. They found that mergers enable firms 
to bundle, which causes energy markets to create incentives to form multi-markets; 
however, they also found that that this type of merger can be negative for social 
welfare. Ng and Donker (2013) found empirical evidence of the effect of reserves and 
oil prices on merger and acquisition activities, as well as on the market performance, 
based on sample data for 18 years of transaction history in Canada. Garcia et al. 
(2014) studied and demonstrated the competitive advantage of a company resulting 
from the combination of assets owned by that company and the capabilities that the 
firm possesses. Shuen et al. (2014) showed that acquisitions are one of the two 
possible options for a company to increase its reserves; the other is through organic 
strategies, such as joint ventures, to support the discovery of new resources. 
 
As has been shown above, there appear to be more reasons for mergers and 
acquisitions than conventional managerial decisions, and some interesting proposals 
have suggested that commodity prices and reserves act as motivating factors for asset 
transactions. These observations will be the basis for the formation of the following 
hypotheses, to which we now turn.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 28 
6. Hypotheses development 
6.1 Reserve potential as motivation for mergers and acquisitions 
Ferguson and Popkin (1982) proposed that the main reason behind mergers and 
acquisitions is to increase the number of reserves for the acquirer. They suggested 
that acquiring reserves targets is a risk-free investment. Later, Ng and Donker 
(2013) further developed this theory: they presented a context in which a high 
demand for energy from countries such as China and India, and a finite supply of 
energy reserves, could explain the reason for the development of the trend for 
high oil prices observed until 2014. 4 Shuen et al. (2014) commented on the two 
options for a company to increase their reserves: 1) through acquisitions of 
proven reserves, and 2) organic strategies, such as joint ventures, to support the 
discovery of new resources. The concept of finite reserves gives a high value to 
the existing reserves of a company; this can be a reason for the high need for 
acquiring reserves and the low number of assets (reserves targets) in the market. 
Mohn and Misund (2011) also commented on how the oil and gas investments 
have focused on increasing the ownership of scarce oil and gas reserves. This 
scenario also presents another situation, where the reduction in reserves, as well 
as the risk-free nature of the assets, motivates acquirers to pay high premiums for 
these targets. Given the reasons above, causality between the energy reserves and 
the amount of mergers and acquisitions will be tested. In addition, the strength of 
this relationship will be investigated. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The NCS energy reserves affect the number of mergers and 
acquisition transactions. 
 
6.2 Commodity price as motivation for mergers and acquisitions 
Boyer and Filion (2007) observed that the price of the commodities that oil and 
gas companies produce is what drives the value of the firms; but no single firm 
has an impact on the commodity price. The changes in the stock market affect the 
acquisition power, as well as the advantages of companies at the time of buying or 
selling; thus it is important to observe that changes in the stock prices of oil and 
                                                
4 The dramatic fall in prices during 2015 is outside the time frame of this study, and 
for that reason it will not be included in the discussion. 
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gas companies are closely related to the commodity prices of oil and gas (Donker 
and Ng, 2013). Shleifer and Vishny (2003) presented the stock market price as the 
reason for the high number of mergers in recent decades. Some authors, among 
them Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005), performed studies to empirically test the stock-
driven acquisitions. Henriques and Sardosky (2011) also evaluated the 
relationship between the volatility in oil prices and the investment strategy of 
companies, finding that during times of high uncertainty, the best strategy is to 
wait until the uncertainty is resolved before investing. However, it was also 
observed that at some point the growth in uncertainty leads to an increase in 
investment. Mohn (2008) concluded that during periods of low oil prices, the 
management of oil companies tends to shift the focus from long-term field 
developments and reserve replacement to short-term accounting returns. This shift 
in investment strategy pushes oil prices up; during this environment of low 
investment the companies gained profitability, but also, due to the investment 
discipline shared by managers, the probability of takeovers increased as well. 
 
This study agrees with the suggestion made by Ng and Donker (2013) that 
commodity prices can influence managers’ decisions on timing mergers and 
acquisitions in the oil and gas industry. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) theorized that 
higher stock prices will also be a motivation for managers to make takeovers. The 
managers of overvalued energy companies could take advantage by acquiring 
undervalued companies (Ng and Donker, 2013). The same could be translated to 
the asset level. This study proposes to evaluate the numbers of transactions as a 
response to changes in the commodity prices of oil and gas, this being an 
extension of the work done by Ng and Donker (2013).  
 
 Hypothesis 2: Oil and gas prices affect the number of merger and acquisition 
transactions. 
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7. Research design and methodology 
7.1 Research design 
The two existing research approaches in the social research field are the qualitative 
and the quantitative. The quantitative research alternative follows the same path as 
research in the natural sciences. Conversely, the qualitative approach has been used 
by social scientists as a better way for the researcher to study human interactions 
(Porta and Keatin, 2008). 
 
After discussing the research approach, it is also important to mention the norms and 
assumptions for both research approaches, from the epistemological and ontological 
standpoints.  
 
Epistemologically, the quantitative approach is usually related to movements seeking 
for objectivity (Positivism, Realism), while the qualitative approach is associated with 
the movements defending the idea that everything concerning humans must be subject 
to interpretation (Interpretivism) (Porta and Keatin, 2008). 
 
The ontological difference between the quantitative and qualitative approach is that 
the former looks for objective knowledge based on facts and hypotheses that can be 
tested, whereas the latter assumes that knowledge can be created and recreated 
depending on the understanding of the world (Porta and Keatin, 2008). 
  
Although there is a general belief in the incompatibility of a multiple strategy 
combining qualitative and quantitative approaches (Robson, 2011), nevertheless many 
authors believe and support the use of a mixed approach. “There are important senses 
in which quantitative and qualitative methods are inseparable” (Howe, 1988, as cited 
by Robson, 2011). 
 
This research consists of three parts and it will use mixed methods. The first part will 
be a causality test between the commodity prices and transactions in the NCS, and 
also the causality between energy reserves and transactions in the NCS.5 The second 
part will focus on measuring the strength of the correlation between the parameters, to 
                                                
5 In this part of the study, only the acquisitions and mergers will be studied. 
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establish if a causality is found between them. A non-parametric ranked Spearman’s 
correlation coefficient will be used as a tool to measure the strength of the 
relationship. These two parts will follow a quantitative approach. The relevant 
characteristics identified with a quantitative approach are mentioned below (Robson, 
2011): 
 
a. The information and data obtained was expressed in numerical form. 
b. The behavior of the transactions was focused on. 
c. Deductive logic was adopted. 
d. Reliability and validity of measurements were described. 
e. Statistical analysis of the data was presented. 
f. Generalization of the findings was sought. 
g. Objectivity was sought. 
 
For the final part of this study, a triangulation method will be used as a way to 
identify and define the possible strategic drivers behind the asset transactions in the 
NCS during the last 14 years. This part will use a mixed approach, combining the 
qualitative and quantitative methods. After obtaining a list of transactions in the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf, the strategic driver behind each of the transactions will 
be identified and a list will be presented; the description of the strategic drivers will 
then be given. As mentioned before, the reasons behind the transactions must be 
understood from a behavioral context (qualitative approach).  
 
7.2 Methodology 
The first part of the analysis will be to verify that the time series used in this analysis 
are stationary; this can be done by conducting an augmented Dickey-Fuller test6, 
based on the hypothesis of the unit root solution against the autoregressive alternative. 
If some of the time series are shown to be non-stationary, the series can be changed to 
                                                
6 Augmented Dickey-Fuller test: 
http://se.mathworks.com/help/econ/adftest.html?searchHighlight=dickey%20fuller.  
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stationary data by using one of the common known methods7 (the log transformation 
will be chosen here for its simplicity).  
 
After it has been confirmed that the time series or the transformed data is stationary, a 
Granger causality test will be run to test the hypothesis of causality; the code used for 
this purpose can be found in the Mathworks library8. If required by the reader, more 
details about the Granger causality test can be found in the original paper published 
by Granger (1969). 
 
Finally, to investigate more in detail the strength of the relationship between the 
variables, the non-parametric Spearman correlation test is used. This correlation 
factor works by ranking each of the variables, and then it correlates them 
 
7.2.1 Reserve potential as motivation for mergers and acquisitions 
The data used for this analysis consists of four time series. The first two time series 
are the annual oil9 and gas reserves estimates made by December 31 of each year. The 
last two correspond; one to the number of merger transactions and the other to 
acquisition transactions, and they are given in the number of deals per year. All the 
data have been obtained from the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate public database 
and the resource report published in 2014; both of them can be accessed in the NPD 
website.  
7.2.2 Commodity price as motivation for mergers and acquisitions 
In this analysis, six time series will be used. The first two time series are the average 
annual Brent spot price and the average annual UK gas price (Heren NBP Index) from 
the “BP Statistical Review of World energy”, 2015.  The changes in the oil price and 
gas price will also be evaluated; it has been decided to evaluate the change as the 
value of the commodity price from the year when the transaction occurs, minus the 
                                                
7 Common transformation methods: http://se.mathworks.com/help/econ/data-
transformations.html?refresh=true 
8 Granger causality test code: 
http://www.mathworks.com/matlabcentral/fileexchange/25467-granger-causality-test.  
9 Although in this study we will talk about oil reserves, it must be observed that the 
reserves presented contain a small fraction of other liquids, such as NGL and 
condensate. 
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commodity price from the previous year. Finally, the last two time series correspond; 
one to the number of merger transactions and the other to the number of acquisition 
transactions. 
 
7.2.3 Strategic drivers behind asset transactions in the NCS during the last 14 years 
For this section, the triangulation method will be used. To present an introduction to 
triangulation, in the words of Denzin and Lincoln (2011): ”Triangulation is not a tool 
or a strategy of validation but an alternative to validation.” In other words, the 
triangulation method works as a means of validating information by cross-verification 
of the results (Stene, 2014). Denzin (2009) proposed four types of triangulation: data 
triangulation, investigator triangulation, theory triangulation, and methodological 
triangulation. This study will apply the first method, where different types of data 
sources will be used to achieve a better understanding of the reasons for the 
transactions, rather than an objective answer; after all, according to Denzin and 
Lincoln (2011), “Objective reality never can be captured.” The sources for our 
analysis will be: 
a. Norwegian Petroleum Directorate historical transaction database. 
b. Bloomberg reports 
c. Public company information published in the company’s own website. 
d. Business experts in the industry 
 
The process used for the classification of the data is described below: 
 
a. All the historical transactions published in the NPD database relating to 
production licenses were gathered. 
b. Items related to company name changes were removed. 
c. The data was reviewed transaction per transaction, to verify the quality of 
the data and to ensure that no “company name change” items remained. 
d. The remaining transactions were divided into the categories of “From” 
(indicating the seller) and “To” (indicating the acquirer). 
e. The author verified the data transaction by transaction, evaluating the 
seller’s perspective with the information available about the production 
license (participation interest before and after the transaction), as well as 
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finance reports that indicated the activity and mission of the company. In 
some cases when the information was insufficient, feedback was received 
by business experts about the history of that particular company and the 
possible reasons for the transaction. After this, the transaction was 
classified from the seller’s perspective. 
f. The process described previously was repeated, but this time from the 
buyer’s perspective.  
g. The main reason for the transaction was given the name of the strategic 
driver for that respective transaction. 
h. When all the transactions were classified, the strategic drivers were 
grouped according to parameters in common, and finally the structure in 
Figure 8.6 was obtained as a qualitative guideline for the classification of 
transactions. The detailed reasons for a transaction being included in that 
strategic driver can be found in Appendix C. 
i. Finally, the strategic drivers were converted into quantitative data; this will 
show the top five common strategic drivers for acquisitions and 
divestitures in the NCS during the last 14 years. 
The list of strategic drivers for NCS during the last 14 years is considered as an 
additional contribution of this research. 
7.2 Sources of Data  
Public databases will be the preferred source of information. The sources of data used 
in this study are listed below: 
1) Norwegian Petroleum Directorate historical transaction database. 
2) Reserve data reported by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate. 
3) Bloomberg reports 
4) Feedback and discussion from business experts 
5) Public company information published in the company’s own website 
6) Commodity prices; the average annual Brent crude oil and the average annual 
UK gas price (Heren NBP Index) are chosen for this study 
7.3 Sampling procedure 
This study will use two main methods of data collection. The first, secondary data 
analysis, will be used by working on data previously collected by the Norwegian 
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Petroleum Directorate  (NPD); this database is open to the public on its website 
(http://factpages.npd.no/factpages/Default.aspx?culture=no). This data contains the 
history of the transactions made in the Norwegian continental shelf. The data of 
interest for this study will be figures listed between January 1, 2000 and December 
31, 2014. Many of the transactions specified in the database are not of interest for this 
study (for example, transactions relating to a change in the name of a company). The 
second method is the content analysis of digital summaries made available to the 
public by Bloomberg, Nordnet or Yahoo; the websites of these companies will be 
used also as a means of gaining information about the strategic drivers behind the 
transaction and the main strategy of the company.  
 
7.4 Limitations 
The Granger causality test must be understood as a probabilistic approach; it is used 
here based on the experience of Ng and Donker (2013) in their study. This will allow 
the results to be comparative, although the period of their research (1990-2008) is a 
little longer than that of this study (2000-2014). 
 
In addition, the use of the augmented Dickey-Fuller test presents three main 
limitations (Sjö, 2008): 
 
1. Choosing the number of lags in the augmentation is a critical factor 
2. The test is based on the assumption of one cointegrating vector. 
3. The test assumes a common factor in the dynamics of the system. If this 
common factor does not hold, the results of the test are not reliable. 
 
The data sources can contain errors in the date of the transaction; and, as was 
observed in some of the transactions, the date could reflect the exact time when the 
transaction was approved by the government and was registered in the database. 
However, the transaction may have been agreed between the companies months in 
advance, so a delay could exist. Some of the transactions during the quality check part 
of the process were found to provide wrong information: for example, items described 
as transactions were found to be merely updates about changes of name in the 
company. 
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Some improvements, such as a longer sample period, and including transaction value 
information, could have given more robustness to the results from this study, but due 
to the limited time, it was decided not to modify the scope of the current study. 
 
Finally, although an objective perspective has been the goal, it cannot be denied that a 
certain interpretivism of the results may be present in the results of the data.  
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8. Results 
 
The number of transactions found in the NPD database for transactions made between 
January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2014 is in total 4578 (see Figure 8.1). The 
transactions are classified as follows: changes in name, transfers (acquisitions and 
divestitures), mergers or takeovers, state direct financial interest (SDFI), and six 
transactions classified as unknown (it was not possible to find information about the 
company involved in the transactions).   
 
 
 
Figure 8.1 Transactions found in the NPD database, after classification.  
 
 
A list of the mergers and takeovers between 2000 and 2014 can be observed in Table 
8.1. The privatization of the Norwegian National Oil Company that resulted in the 
formation of Statoil and Petoro in 2001 has not been included in the list. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
674
2467
857
574
6
Change-of-Name Transfers Mergers SDFI Unknown
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Table 8.1 Mergers during 2000-2014 observed in the study 
Company 1 Company 2 Year of  
Merge or acquisition 
Saga  Norsk Hydro 1999 
Total Elf 2000 
Fortum Enig 2002 
Conoco Phillip 2002 
Enterprise Shell 2002 
Agip Eni 2003 
Ruhrgas E.ON 2003 
Paladin Talisman 2005 
Statoil Norsk Hydro 2006 
Dana Ener 2007 
Revus Wintershall 2008 
Petro Cananda Suncor 2009 
VNG Endevour 2009 
Aker Exploration DNO 2009 
Spike Exploration Bridge energy 2013 
Tullow Wintershall 2014 
 
As discussed in Section 7.2, the results for the augmented Dickey-Fuller test for the 
time series used in the analysis are shown below: 
 
Table 8.2 Results from the augmented Dickey-Fuller test: the non-stationary data 
hypothesis is tested 
 
 
First, the results for the causality test between reserves and merger and acquisition 
transactions will be presented and described. Second, the results for the causality test 
between commodity prices and merger and acquisition transactions will be presented 
Variable p Hypothesis
Acquisitions 0.77790 Accept
Mergers 0.00600 Reject
Oil8price 0.82270 Accept
Gas8price 0.55310 Accept
Change8in8oil8price 0.00001 Reject
Change8in8gas8price 0.00001 Reject
Oil8reserves 0.00330 Reject
Gas8reserves 0.61470 Accept
Acquisitions* 0.00001 Reject
Oil8price* 0.00490 Reject
Gas8price* 0.00001 Reject
Gas8reserves* 0.00001 Reject
*After8log8transformation
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and described. Finally, an interpretation of the strategic drivers found in the NCS will 
be presented and discussed. 
8.1 Reserve potential as motivation for mergers and acquisitions 
Based on the previous discussion, the main aim behind acquisitions and mergers is to 
increase the reserves for a given company; as long as the reserves decrease, the 
number of acquisitions and mergers will increase as a means of compensating for this, 
and ensuring ownership of the reserves available. In Figures 8.2 and 8.3 it is possible 
to observe how the oil and gas reserves10 have been decreasing during the last 13 
years; however, the number of transactions related to acquisitions shows an increasing 
trend. It is difficult to observe a trend in the number of transactions related to mergers. 
Donker and Ng (2013) observed a similar trend in the merger and acquisition 
activities in Canada. There are two important findings of Donker and Ng (2013) that 
can enhance our understanding of asset transactions in the NCS, as follows: 1) there is 
an inverse relationship between the number of acquisition transactions and the amount 
of energy reserves (limited supply will increase the need of ownership of the 
remaining supply); and 2) the value of the reserves seems to increase over time. 
 
 
Figure 8.2 Oil reserves, mergers and acquisitions in the NCS between 2000 and 2014. 
                                                
10 The delivered production, as the contingent resources are not included in the 
reserves shown in this study. 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
O
il$
re
se
rv
es
$(M
ill
$sm
3)
N
um
be
r$o
f$t
ra
sa
ct
io
ns
$p
er
$y
ea
r
Acquisitions Mergers Oil:reserves
 40 
 
A Granger causality test will be used to examine the hypothesis that oil reserves cause 
acquisitions, and oil reserves cause mergers. The exercise will be repeated for oil 
reserves causing acquisitions, as well as for gas reserves causing mergers. The results 
for the Granger causality test can be observed in Table 8.3. The results seem to be 
consistent for a 10% and 5% significance level. The oil reserves affect the number of 
acquisitions and mergers; this relationship is negative and moderate between oil 
reserves and acquisitions, and positive and weak between oil reserves and mergers 
(see Table 8.4), according to the Spearman’s coefficient results. However, it seems 
that the acquisitions and mergers do not cause changes in oil reserves.  The reverse 
seems to be the case for gas reserves: the gas reserves do not cause mergers and 
acquisitions, but instead the mergers and acquisitions cause changes in the gas 
reserves. By evaluating the Spearman’s coefficient, it is possible to notice that the 
relationship between gas reserves and number of transactions related to acquisitions 
seems to be negative, but in relation with mergers seems to be positive.  
 
 
Figure 8.3 Gas reserves, mergers and acquisitions in the NCS between 2000 and 
2014. 
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The results conclude that the hypothesis of mergers and acquisitions being a way to 
increase ownership in the existing oil reserves is valid; and it also seems that changes 
in gas reserves are a consequence of the merger and acquisition activities. 
 
Table 8.3. Granger causality test results between the energy reserves and mergers and 
acquisitions 
 
 
Table 8.4 Spearman correlation results for energy reserves with relation to mergers 
and acquisitions 
Var$1$ Var$2$  r P$
Oil$reserves$ Acquisition$ 00.51$ 0.06$
Oil$reserves$ Mergers$ 0.25$ 0.39$
Gas$Reserves$ Acquisition$ 00.26$ 0.37$
Gas$Reserves$ Mergers$ 0.16$ 0.58$
 
8.2 Commodity price as motivation for mergers and acquisitions 
In this section, the causality between commodity prices and the number of 
acquisitions and merger transactions will be evaluated, as well as the changes in the 
commodity prices set against the number of transactions. A Granger causality test will 
be used to evaluate the causality. The changes in the commodity prices will be 
understood as the difference between the price during the year of the transactions and 
the one of the previous year, to assess the change in oil  and gas price.  
 
 
F"Statistic Critical_Value A/R F"Statistic Critical_Value A/R
Oil$reserves does$not$Granger$cause Acquisitions 6.648 4.103 Reject 6.648 2.9245 Reject
Oil$reserves does$not$Granger$cause Mergers 8.305 4.257 Reject 8.305 3.007 Reject
Acquisitions does$not$Granger$cause Oil$reserves 1.151 4.965 Accept 1.151 3.285 Accept
Mergers does$not$Granger$cause Oil$reserves 2.273 4.965 Accept 2.273 3.285 Accept
Gas$reserves does$not$Granger$cause Acquisitions 1.252 4.965 Accept 1.252 3.285 Accept
Gas$reserves does$not$Granger$cause Mergers 1.679 4.965 Accept 1.679 3.285 Accept
Acquisitions does$not$Granger$cause Gas$reserves 17.512 4.257 Reject 17.512 3.007 Reject
Mergers does$not$Granger$cause Gas$reserves 23.890 4.257 Reject 23.890 3.007 Reject
Null4hypothesis 5%4significance4level 10%4significance4level
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Figure 8.4 Oil prices, mergers and acquisitions in the NCS between 2000 and 2014. 
 
The results for the Granger causality test can be observed in Table 8.4. The results 
found for the sample of transactions show some differences with the findings of 
Donker and Ng (2013) for the Canadian region. It seems that neither the oil or gas 
prices cause acquisition or merger transactions, nor do the acquisitions or merger 
transactions cause oil or gas prices: most of the results are consistent at the 5% and 
10% significance level11. In the contrary, the results show that changes in oil prices 
can cause acquisitions, and that mergers and acquisitions cause changes in oil prices: 
the results are consistent at the 5% and 10% significance level12. From these results 
one can deduce that decisions regarding acquisition transactions are influenced by the 
change in oil price, and at a certain level, the acquisitions and merger transactions can 
influence the change in oil prices. Mohn (2008) mentioned in his conclusions that 
during periods of low oil price, the management of oil companies tends to shift the 
focus from long-term field developments and reserve replacement to short-term 
accounting returns. This shift in investment strategy pushes oil prices up; during this 
environment of low investment the companies gain profitability, but also due to the 
                                                
11 Mergers Granger causes oil prices at the 10% significance level, but not at the 5% 
significance level. 
12 Gas prices Granger causes mergers at the 10% significance level, but not at the 5% 
significance level 
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investment discipline shared by managers, the probability of takeovers increases as 
well. Based on the fact that the oil production from Norway in 2014 was about 3.3% 
13 of the global Non-OPEC production during 2014, the expectation is that acquisition 
and merger transactions in the NCS will have a small effect or influence in changes in 
the oil price; although here the results show a different situation: that acquisitions and 
merger transactions could potentially lead to changes in oil prices. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.5 Gas prices, mergers and acquisitions in the NCS between 2000 and 2014.  
 
 
 
The results for Spearman’s correlation coefficient are presented in Table 8.5. 
Evaluating the strength of the relationship between oil price changes and acquisition 
and merger transactions, for both cases the coefficient shows a weak negative 
correlation. The significance of the correlation is more than 46% for acquisitions and 
more than 32% for mergers. One can argue that although causality has been proved, 
the strength of the relationship between the variables is weak and moderately 
significant. 
 
                                                
13 Source: EIA: http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/report/global_oil.cfm  
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Table 8.4 Granger causality test results between the oil and gas prices and mergers 
and acquisitions 
 
 
Table 8.5 Spearman correlation results for oil and gas prices with relation to mergers 
and acquisitions 
Var$1$ Var$2$  r P$
Oil$price$ Acquisition$ 0.57$ 0.03$
Oil$price$ Mergers$ 00.28$ 0.31$
Gas$price$ Acquisition$ 0.50$ 0.06$
Gas$price$ Mergers$ 00.30$ 0.27$
Oil$price$change$ Acquisition$ 00.21$ 0.46$
Oil$price$change$ Mergers$ 00.28$ 0.32$
Gas$price$change$ Acquisition$ 0.04$ 0.88$
Gas$price$change$ Mergers$ 00.36$ 0.19$
 
 
8.3 Strategic drivers behind asset transactions in the NCS during the last 14 years 
“Strategic driver” will be the term given to the reason for a transaction. To identify 
the existing strategic drivers, a list of different strategic drivers has been obtained, 
based on the possible strategies for a company in the Norwegian Continental Shelf 
with respect to asset transactions. Four possible strategies were identified: a) to buy, 
b) to sell, c) to merge or take over, and d) to swap. Some clarification may be required 
concerning the merging and takeover strategy: although to merge and to take over are 
different possibilities, the outcome is almost the same, in that two or more portfolios 
of assets are merged into one.  
F"Statistic Critical_Value A/R F"Statistic Critical_Value A/R
Oil$price does$not$Granger$cause Acquisitions 1.496 4.844 Accept 1.496 3.225 Accept
Oil$price does$not$Granger$cause Mergers 0.518 4.965 Accept 0.518 3.285 Accept
Acquisitions does$not$Granger$cause Oil$price 4.103 5.840 Accept 2.925 5.840 Accept
Mergers does$not$Granger$cause Oil$price 3.676 4.844 Accept 3.676 3.225 Reject
Gas$price does$not$Granger$cause Acquisitions 2.186 4.844 Accept 2.186 3.225 Accept
Gas$price does$not$Granger$cause Mergers 2.740 4.257 Accept 2.740 3.007 Accept
Acquisitions does$not$Granger$cause Gas$price 2.384 4.103 Accept 2.384 2.925 Accept
Mergers does$not$Granger$cause Gas$price 3.149 4.844 Accept 3.149 3.225 Accept
Oil$price$changes does$not$Granger$cause Acquisitions 4.789 4.103 Reject 4.789 2.925 Reject
Oil$price$changes does$not$Granger$cause Mergers 0.155 4.965 Accept 0.155 3.285 Accept
Acquisitions does$not$Granger$cause Oil$price$changes 5.076 4.257 Reject 5.076 3.007 Reject
Mergers does$not$Granger$cause Oil$price$changes 23.474 4.257 Reject 23.474 3.007 Reject
Gas$price$changes does$not$Granger$cause Acquisitions 2.949 4.103 Accept 2.949 2.925 Reject
Gas$price$changes does$not$Granger$cause Mergers 0.077 4.965 Accept 0.077 3.285 Accept
Acquisitions does$not$Granger$cause Gas$price$changes 0.482 4.844 Accept 0.482 3.225 Accept
Mergers does$not$Granger$cause Gas$price$changes 2.556 4.103 Accept 2.556 2.925 Accept
Null4hypothesis 5%4significance4level 10%4significance4level
 45 
 
Figure 8.6. Proposed classification for the strategic drivers defined in this 
study. 
 
After the classification transaction by transaction14had been made, the different 
strategic drivers were grouped in different categories. The result can be observed in 
the figure above (Figure 8.6). A more detailed account of transactions can be found in 
Appendix B, and a more detailed description of each of the strategic drivers is 
presented in Appendix C.  
 
In the case of divestitures, three main strategic drivers were found, and the number of 
transactions was plotted per category and by NCS region. The most common reason 
for the divestitures transactions is the “exit asset”, in which the seller completely 
disposes of the asset. It is possible to observe that although the “exit asset” is the 
primary reason for divestitures of assets in the North Sea region, nevertheless “cash” 
is the main driver for the Norwegian and the Barents Sea regions.   
 
                                                
14 This is described in more detail in the methodology section 
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Figure 8.7. Total number of divestiture transactions per NCS region for the period 
from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2014 
 
The acquisitions transactions were then plotted by strategic driver and by region of 
the NCS, and the results can be observed in the figure below (Figure 8.8). The top 
five strategic drivers identified in the NCS (1 being the most common) are as follows: 
 
1. Explore, develop and produce 
2. Explore, develop, produce and obtain operatorship  
3. New player 
4. Explore and sell 
5. Gas driven 
 
It seems that after the modifications in tax regulations (mentioned previously at the 
end of Section 3.3), it is not surprising to observe that exploration is one of the 
second-highest activities within the strategic drivers. Development and production are 
also among the most common activities in the whole NCS. 
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Figure 8.8. Total number of acquisition transactions per NCS region for the period 
from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2014 
 
 
Table 8.6. List of the strategic drivers and the nomenclature used for the acquisition 
transactions. 
Letter Strategic Driver 
A$ Active$regional$presence$
B$ Energy$portfolio$
C$
Explore,$produce,$develop$and$obtain$
operatorship$
D$ Explore$and$sell$
E$ Explore,$develop$and$sell$
F$ Explore,$develop$and$produce$
G$ Gas$driven$
H$ Government$interest$
I$ Regional$focus$
J$ New$player$
K$ Tail0end$producer$
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9. Discussion 
 
Ferguson and Popkin (1982) were the first researchers to propose that energy reserves 
are one of the reasons for mergers and acquisitions. Later, Ng and Donker (2013) 
proposed novel motivations for mergers and acquisitions, related to commodity prices 
and increase in proven reserves; they supported their theory with empirical evidence 
from the oil and energy sector in Canada. The first part of this study extends their 
work to the Norwegian Continental Shelf, evaluating it in terms of the asset level. It 
was found that oil reserves are linked to the merger and acquisition transactions on 
the Norwegian Continental Shelf, and the motivation to increase the proven oil 
reserves by merging or acquiring assets from other companies is thus a valid theory. 
The idea that the oil reserves will become valuable over time seems to fit perfectly 
with the behavior of mergers and acquisitions on the NCS. However, it also seems 
that merger and acquisition transactions are causing changes in gas reserves, meaning 
that the gas reserves are an upside consequence from the mergers and acquisitions, 
but it seems not to be the main reason for transactions activities.  
 
Ng and Donker (2013) found that in Canada the commodity prices were related to 
mergers and acquisitions, in that oil prices caused these activities, and mergers and 
acquisitions caused changes in gas prices. At the time of evaluating this behavior on 
the NCS, the results were quite different: the oil prices seemed not to be related to the 
merger and acquisition transactions, but at the time of evaluating these changes (a 
one-year window), it was possible to observe that oil price changes tend to influence 
acquisitions, and that merger and acquisitions activities tend to influence changes in 
the oil price. Although it may be expected that the transactions would not have any 
influence on the changes in the oil price, nevertheless an explanation presented by 
Mohn (2008) should be considered. This theory states that during periods of low oil 
price, the focus of management decisions will change from long-term field 
developments and reserve replacement to short-term accounting returns, and that this 
shift in investment strategy pushes oil prices higher. According to this possibility, 
companies’ strategy is focused on mergers and acquisitions, rather than on long-term 
development that would cause changes in the oil prices. Consequently, the NCS 
results could be a downscale image of a global trend for the period studied. In any 
case, studying a longer period of transaction history could help to confirm the results 
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and make the explanation more robust. Surprisingly, the gas price, or changes to it, 
seems not to have any effect on the merger and acquisition transactions.  
 
During the qualitative evaluation of the strategic drivers behind the transactions, a 
classification of them was made. It is possible that the classification could give 
different results from another observer perspective, but if the triangulation method is 
followed and the classification rules presented here are used as guidelines, it is 
expected that the results of the classifications will be close to those presented here. 
Three main reasons for divestitures were found, and among them the “exit asset” 
seems to be the principal one. In the case of acquisitions, “Explore and produce”, the 
traditional strategic driver for major oil companies, seems to be at the top of list. 
Mergers and takeovers are evaluated as a strategy as well as swapping assets, but 
although the latter was presented (based on the rules defined for its classification), it 
is quite difficult to evaluate without real and strong evidence of a commercial 
agreement between the involved parties. It should be mentioned that there are certain 
differences between the three different regions of the Norwegian Continental Shelf 
(North Sea, Norwegian Sea and Barents Sea). Some strategic drivers that seem similar 
in the North and Norwegian Sea regions seem not to exist in the Barents Sea region. 
One example could be the “New player” strategic driver, which indicates that new 
companies deciding to invest in the NCS will not regard investing in the Barents Sea 
region as a primary option (at least during the first year).  
 
Finally, the main contribution of this study has been to show that oil reserves and 
changes in oil prices have been identified as parameters driving asset transactions on 
the Norwegian Continental Shelf, giving support to the empirical findings made by 
Ng and Donker (2013). In addition, a qualitative approach was used to obtain a better 
understanding of the strategic drivers on the NCS during the last 14 years. This study 
could be considered as a starting point for more detailed studies and evaluations in the 
field of mergers and acquisitions. With the NCS energy reserves diminishing, 
according to existing reports, and a forecast of high capital investments in the near 
future, it is clear that this is a valuable field for study. 
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10. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
What drives asset transactions on the Norwegian continental shelf? Although some 
authors will argue about the variety of managerial reasons behind the asset 
transactions, in this study the novel reasons proposed by Ng and Donker (2013) were 
tested, and having evaluated a sample of asset transactions between 2000 and 2014, it 
can be concluded that both oil reserves and changes in the oil price seem to influence 
asset transactions on the Norwegian continental shelf. Increase in gas reserves seems 
to be a beneficial consequence of merger and acquisition transactions, rather than a 
reason for asset transactions.  
 
This study did not evaluate the relationship or causality between the performance of 
the acquirers and the number of mergers and acquisition transactions, but research in 
this area is recommended as a possible way forward to gain a better understanding of 
the Norwegian Continental Shelf asset transactions. The value of the transactions was 
not evaluated in the current study, and it must be observed that sometimes the value 
of the transaction could also provide extra information about the asset transactions. 
The information about the values of the different transactions was not easily 
accessible, and because of the limitation of time, it was decided to omit it from the 
scope of the study. It is also important to evaluate how other parameters, such as the 
exchange rate, could also influence the transactions.  
 
A list of the strategic drivers for the period evaluated was presented. Each of the 
strategic drivers was defined, and a triangulation method was used to analyze 
different sources of data, to provide as objective a result as possible. The 
classification of strategic drivers presented here is merely a starting point: it aims to 
provide a guide for a better understanding of the strategic reasons behind asset 
transactions, and it could be improved considerably by future research and 
information gathered in this area. 
 
 
This study supports previous findings by Ng and Donker (2013) regarding the 
influence that energy reserves and commodity prices appear to have on the 
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managerial decisions taken concerning merger and acquisition transactions, by 
analyzing empirical asset transaction data from the Norwegian Continental Shelf.  
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Appendix A 
Area status of the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) per June 2014 
 
 
Source: Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 
http://www.npd.no/Global/Norsk/4-Kart/Sokkelkart2014/Arealstatuskart.jpg 
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Appendix B 
 
Table B.1 Summary of the divestiture transactions in the NCS, 2000-2014 
Divestiture transactions 
Year Exit Asset Transaction Reduce exposure Total 
2000$ 19$ 19$ 2$ 40$
2001$ 31$ 27$ 1$ 59$
2002$ 34$ 45$ 0$ 79$
2003$ 46$ 16$ 1$ 63$
2004$ 47$ 20$ 6$ 73$
2005$ 38$ 22$ 5$ 65$
2006$ 18$ 29$ 4$ 51$
2007$ 22$ 22$ 2$ 46$
2008$ 34$ 33$ 8$ 75$
2009$ 23$ 37$ 5$ 65$
2010$ 35$ 41$ 2$ 78$
2011$ 53$ 22$ 1$ 76$
2012$ 68$ 52$ 1$ 121$
2013$ 41$ 92$ 2$ 135$
2014$ 42$ 68$ 4$ 114$
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Table B.2 Summary of the acquisition transactions in the NCS, 2000-2014 
Acquisition transactions 
Year A B C D E F G H I J K Total 
2000# 0# 1# 0# 0# 0# 20# 0# 10# 0# 12# 0# 43#
2001# 0# 0# 3# 0# 0# 39# 0# 1# 0# 14# 0# 57#
2002# 1# 13# 16# 1# 0# 42# 0# 1# 0# 11# 0# 85#
2003# 0# 7# 14# 2# 0# 34# 4# 1# 0# 5# 2# 69#
2004# 0# 0# 9# 1# 0# 35# 1# 0# 0# 21# 0# 67#
2005# 0# 0# 20# 0# 2# 27# 1# 3# 0# 6# 0# 59#
2006# 3# 0# 8# 0# 4# 18# 2# 0# 0# 16# 1# 52#
2007# 2# 1# 1# 0# 0# 12# 0# 0# 0# 30# 0# 46#
2008# 3# 1# 8# 8# 3# 25# 5# 1# 0# 25# 0# 79#
2009# 2# 0# 22# 6# 3# 13# 7# 0# 6# 3# 1# 63#
2010# 0# 0# 22# 14# 0# 34# 4# 3# 1# 3# 0# 81#
2011# 1# 0# 13# 2# 1# 26# 6# 2# 14# 10# 0# 75#
2012# 0# 0# 28# 5# 2# 56# 3# 4# 6# 22# 0# 126#
2013# 1# 2# 60# 17# 0# 19# 8# 1# 10# 23# 3# 144#
2014# 3# 0# 36# 14# 0# 25# 15# 0# 12# 10# 3# 118#
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Table B.3 Summary of the mergers and swapping transactions in the NCS, 2000-2014 
Other Strategic drivers 
Year Mergers/Take overs Swappings 
2000 11 16 
2001 92 4 
2002 3 9 
2003 41 2 
2004 0 0 
2005 8 6 
2006 0 8 
2007 151 4 
2008 24 6 
2009 56 5 
2010 2 10 
2011 8 12 
2012 1 16 
2013 0 21 
2014 30 9 
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Appendix C Strategic drivers definition 
Buying assets 
All the transactions relating to acquisitions of assets will be in this main group. Some 
sublevels have been identified and will be defined. 
• Regional interest 
o Regional focus: The company has identified the NCS as a 
strategic region for its operations. 
o Regional presence: The NCS has not been established as a 
strategic region for the company, but as an option to diversify 
its portfolio. The company is interested in to show its presence 
by participating in sharing risk exploration and small 
investments in the region. 
o Government Interest: Mainly these transactions will be linked 
to Petoro; any transaction into acquisition of assets will be 
perceived as a way to represent the interests of the government. 
It is important to notice that Statoil after 2001 is observed as 
another major oil company with its main strategy in exploration 
and production. 
• Life Stage 
o Explore and sell: This is the strategy followed by some 
companies, who are interested in the first phase of a field 
(exploration). Investments are focused into acquiring licenses 
with potential, obtaining seismic and interpreting results; some 
of them will even participate in the investment of the first 
exploration well. After a finding is made, the participation in 
the production license will be sold to other companies 
interested in the appraisal or development of the asset. 
o Explore, develop and sell: Similarly to the previous strategy, 
the company will explore and invest in the first state of the 
development. It is assumed these companies are not interested 
in long commitments, and they will try to sell their 
participation in the asset during the early production stage. 
o Explore and produce: This is a general strategy that is linked to 
the major oil companies in the region, due to their interest in 
both production and reserves. They are interested as much in 
exploration as they are in the development and production 
phase.  
o Explore, produce, develop and obtain operatorship: This 
strategy is used by some companies that have less capital that 
the oil majors, but have shown a strong interest in not just 
exploring, developing, and producing, but they are also willing 
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to pay a premium price to become an operator in assets in the 
region, and to establish a real commitment in the area. 
o Tail-end producer: This strategy is followed by some 
companies interested in the last production stage of some of old 
fields; the production rates are relatively low for medium and 
large oil companies, but some of the companies have created a 
competitive advantage from assets at the end of their lives. 
• Product 
o Gas phase driven: The strategy of gas phase driven was 
selected mainly to reflect the well-known strategy of GDF, 
which is interested mainly in fields where gas is produced, or 
there is a high probability of increasing the gas production into 
certain assets for the future. There are some other companies 
that can also be classified in this category, but GDF is the best 
example. 
• Market 
o New player: This strategy was established as a way to reduce 
the noise created by the acquisition of assets by new companies 
entering the NCS. The new player strategy is the classification 
given to all the transactions made by a company during the first 
year after a valid permission to operate or acquire assets has 
been given by the Norwegian authorities. 
o Energy portfolio: This strategic driver is related to companies 
that are investing in oil and gas assets as a strategy for 
diversifying their current portfolio. 
Selling assets 
All the transactions relating to divestiture of assets will be in this main group. Some 
sublevels have been identified and will be defined. 
• Exit asset: The exit asset strategy will be identified when a company 
has decided to sell its entire participation in that asset to another 
company. 
• Cash: any transaction that involves partial reduction in the 
participation of the asset will be assumed to be due to the cash behind 
the transaction. This could be due to a higher value offered by the 
buyer, or by at the same time reducing future investments that the 
seller has identified beforehand. 
• Reduce exposure: All the transactions in which a company holding a 
100 percent interest in a production license wants to reduce its 
participation will belong to this class. The main reason assumed to be 
behind this strategy is reducing the exposure to high investment costs 
or preventing high risk in the planned operations. 
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Merging assets/Takeovers 
Many merging or takeover operations took place during the period evaluated; 
although the reasons why the companies merged can differ, it was decided to observe 
these transactions as part of a single strategy. 
Swapping assets 
It must be observed that swapping will be classified as any interchange of assets 
between two companies in which there is at least one month between transactions, as 
well as a ratio of 1 to 3 (for 1 asset given, at least 3 will be received), for it to be 
classified as an assets swap. 
